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Macroeconomic risk assessments play an important role in the forecasts of many
institutions. However, to the best of our knowledge their performance has not
been investigated yet. In this work, we study the Bank of England’s risk forecasts
for inﬂation. We ﬁnd that these forecasts do not contain the intended information.
Rather, they either have no information content, or even an adverse information
content. Our results imply that under mean squared error loss, it is better to use
the Bank of England’s mode forecasts than the Bank of England’s mean forecasts.
Keywords: Forecast evaluation; risk forecasts; Bank of England inﬂation fore-
casts
JEL-Classiﬁcation: E37, C12, C53Non-technical summary
Many institutions providing macroeconomic forecasts add risk assessments to these
forecasts. Not all of them are explicit about the deﬁnition of risk. However, those
institutions giving a precise deﬁnition as e.g= the International Monetary Fund or
t h eB a n ko fE n g l a n ds t a t et h a ta nu p w a r dr i s ki m p l i e st h a tt h ee x p e c t e dv a l u e
of the forecasted variable lies above the value published as the central projection.
Accordingly, a downward risk implies that the expected value of the forecasted
variable lies below the value published as the central projection. The value pub-
lished as the central projection by these institutions is the most likely single value,
also called the mode forecast. The mean forecast, i.e. the expected value of the
forecasted variable, thus results from the mode forecast and the forecasted risk.
Although many institutions publish risk forecasts, to the best of our knowledge
the performance of these forecasts has not been studied yet. In this work, we try
to close this gap by investigating the Bank of England’s risk forecasts for inﬂation.
Our ﬁndings indicate that these forecasts do not perform well.
If the risk forecasts are optimal they should improve the central projections. More-
over, they should not improve the mean forecasts. We ﬁnd that the Bank of Eng-
land’s risk forecasts do not possess these properties. Apparently, it is possible to
improve the mean forecasts by considering information contained in the risk fore-
casts, and it is not possible to improve the central projections by considering the
risk forecasts. In the sample under study, for several forecast horizons it is even
possible to improve the central projections by considering the opposite of the risk
forecast. This ﬁnding is related to the fact that often forecasted upward risks are
followed by the realization of downward risks or forecasted downward risks by the
realization of upward risks.
A major reason for the poor performance of the risk forecasts is probably given
by the di!culties to identify and to quantify risks in the determinants of future
inﬂation, as e.g. oil prices and exchange rates.
Our results imply that the Bank of England’s central projection for inﬂation,
the mode forecast, is closer to expected inﬂation than the forecast for expected
inﬂation, the mean forecast.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Viele Institutionen, die makroökonomische Prognosen erstellen, versehen ihre Prog-
nosen mit Risikoeinschätzungen. Nicht alle geben explizit an, wie diese Risiken
deﬁniert sind. Aber jene Institutionen, die eine präzise Deﬁnition anführen, wie
zum Beispiel der Internationale Währungsfonds und die Bank of England, erk-
lären, dass das Vorliegen eines Aufwärtsrisikos bedeutet, dass der erwartete Wert
der prognostizierten Variable über jenem Wert liegt, der als Basislinie prognos-
tiziert wird. Entsprechend liegt ein Abwärtsrisiko vor, wenn der erwartete Wert
der prognostizierten Variablen unter jenem Wert liegt, der als Basislinie prognos-
tiziert wird. Der von diesen Institutionen als Basislinie veröentlichte Wert ist der
wahrscheinlichste Wert und wird auch als Modusprognose bezeichnet. Die Mittel-
wertprognose, also der erwartete Wert der prognostizierten Variablen, ergibt sich
somit aus der Modusprognose und dem prognostizierten Risiko.
Obwohl viele Institutionen Risikoprognosen veröentlichen, ist die Güte dieser
Prognosen nach unserem Wissen noch nicht untersucht werden. In dieser Arbeit
versuchen wir, diese Lücke zu schließen, indem wir die Risikoprognosen für Inﬂation
der Bank of England auswerten. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass diese
Prognosen keine guten Ergebnisse liefern.
Wenn die Risikoprognosen optimal sind, so sollten sie die Basislinie verbessern
können. Andererseits sollten sie nicht in der Lage sein, die Mittelwertprognosen
zu verbessern. Es stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass die Risikoprognosen für Inﬂation
der Bank of England nicht diese genannten Eigenschaften besitzen. Es ist oenbar
möglich die Mittelwertprognosen zu verbessern, indem man in den Risikoprog-
nosen enthaltene Informationen berücksichtigt. Außerdem ist es nicht möglich,
die Basislinie zu verbessern, in dem man die Risikoprognosen berücksichtigt. In
der untersuchten Stichprobe kann bei einigen Prognosehorizonten sogar die Ba-
sislinie verbessert werden, indem man entgegengesetzte Risikoprognosen berück-
sichtigt. Diese Beobachtung hängt damit zusammen, dass häuﬁg auf prognos-
tizierte Aufwärtsrisiken die Realisation von Abwärtsrisiken oder auf prognostizierte
Abwärtsrisiken die Realisation von Aufwärtsrisiken folgte.
Ein Hauptgrund für die schlechten Ergebnisse der Risikoprognosen dürfte sein,
dass es sehr schwierig ist, Risiken für die Bestimmungsfaktoren der Inﬂation, wiezum Beispiel Ölpreise und Wechselkurse, zu identiﬁzieren und zu quantiﬁzieren.
Aus unseren Ergebnissen lässt sich schließen, dass die Basislinie der Bank of Eng-
land, die Modusprognose, der erwarteten Inﬂation näherkommt als die Prognose
der erwarteten Inﬂation, die Mittelwertprognose.Contents
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A Appendix: Mode and Mean Forecasts and Realizations 29How Informative Are Macroeconomic Risk
Forecasts?
An Examination of the Bank of England’s
Inﬂation Forecasts1
1 Introduction
Many institutions providing macroeconomic forecasts add risk assessments to these
forecasts. For example, the International Monetary Fund states in its World Eco-
nomic Outlook from October 2007 that, considering the global GDP growth fore-
cast, “the risks to the baseline forecast are distinctly to the downside. [...] The
main sources of the increase in the downside risk since the July 2007 update come
from deteriorating ﬁnancial conditions and from the uncertain prospects for do-
mestic demand in the United States and Europe” (p= 8). In its Inﬂation Report
from February 2007, the Bank of England remarks that “The risks to inﬂation are
weighted to the downside in the near term and to the upside in the medium term.”
(pp= 45-46). Similar statements can be found in the publications of several other
institutions, among them, for example, the European Central Bank, the Banco de
Portugal and the Deutsche Bundesbank.2 Thus, announcing forecast risks appears
to play an important role in the communication of forecast results.
1Authors: Malte Knüppel and Guido Schultefrankenfeld, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research
Centre, Wilhelm-Epstein-Straße 14, D-60431 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Corresponding au-
thor’s e-mail: malte.knueppel@bundesbank.de. This work represents the authors’ personal opin-
ion and does not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its sta.W ew o u l d
like to thank Jörg Breitung, Heinz Herrmann and Karl-Heinz Tödter as well as seminar partic-
ipants at the Bank of England and the Deutsche Bundesbank for very helpful comments and
discussions.
2For instance, the European Central Bank in its Monthly Bulletin from December 2007 de-
clares that with respect to the inﬂation forecast, “Risks to this outlook are fully conﬁrmed to lie
on the upside. These risks include the possibility of further rises in oil and agricultural prices,
as well as of unanticipated increases in administered prices and indirect taxes” (p= 55). The
1The presence of forecast risks is caused by asymmetries of the respective fore-
cast densities. Some institutions, for instance, speak of an upward risk to the
forecast if the forecasted mean exceeds the forecasted mode of their density fore-
casts. Assessing the asymmetry of a forecast density, i.e= forecasting a phenomenon
related to third moments is surely an extremely challenging task.
This might be illustrated by the fact that many institutions calculate forecast
uncertainty, i.e= a phenomenon related to second moments and therefore in general
easier to assess, based on past forecast errors. This is done due to the lack of
models which can accomplish this task, as explained by Wallis (1989). However,
if it is so di!cult to forecast the uncertainty surrounding an institution’s forecast
appropriately, it is questionable whether risks can be forecasted in a reasonable
manner. Given that so many institutions face the challenge of risk forecasting
despite the di!culties to be encountered, it is important and interesting to ﬁnd
out how successful these risk forecasts are.
Of all the institutions mentioned, the Bank of England (henceforth BoE) fea-
tures the largest published risk forecasting record. Moreover, in contrast to most
other institutions, the BoE produces quarterly, and not only annual risk forecasts.
Finally, it does not only publish qualitative, but also quantitative risk assessments.
Actually, the BoE publishes density forecasts, from which point forecasts, uncer-
tainty forecasts and risk forecasts can be derived. Therefore, our analysis focuses
on the BoE’s forecasts.
Since the BoE’s record of macroeconomic density forecasts is relatively large,
its forecasts are a highly favoured object of investigation in economics. The BoE’s
forecasts are studied inter alia by Dowd (2007), Wallis (2003), Wallis (2004), and
Elder et al. (2005). Most studies are concerned with the accurateness of the point
and uncertainty forecasts, but also the appropriateness of the entire forecast den-
sity is evaluated. Up to now, however, apparently no study has focused on the
risk forecasts. So far, these forecasts have at best been evaluated in the context
Banco de Portugal claims that “As regards the projection for the inﬂation rate, risks appear
to be broadly balanced in 2007 and slightly biased downwards in 2008, due to the risk of ap-
preciation of the euro exchange rate” (p= 31) in its Economic Bulletin from summer 2007. The
Deutsche Bundesbank in its Monthly Bulletin from December 2007 remarks that “[...] The price-
dampening impact of the appreciation of the euro so far might also be stronger than expected
and the euro could continue to appreciate. Taking everything together, however, the upside risks
to future price developments predominate at the end of the forecasting horizon” (p= 29).
2of investigations of the entire forecast density. For instance, Wallis (2003) states
that “the excessive concern with upside risk was not justiﬁed over the period con-
sidered.” (p= 165). Yet, it remains to be analyzed how informative the BoE’s risk
forecasts are in general. In this work, we attempt to assess the information content
of the BoE’s risk forecasts for inﬂation.
This assessment is performed in the context of tests for forecast optimality.
The risk forecasts are supposed not to contain information which can reduce the
mean squared forecast error of the mean forecasts. However, for reasons that will
become clear below, the risk forecasts are supposed to reduce the mean squared
forecast error of the mode forecasts. Both hypotheses will be investigated in this
study.
We brieﬂy present the concepts underlying the BoE’s risk forecasts and the
data in Section 2. In Section 3, the optimality of risk forecasts is investigated.
Robustness checks are carried out in Section 4. Section 5 deals with possible
explanations for the BoE’s risk forecasting performance. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e D a t a
Since February 1996, the BoE publishes its inﬂation forecast in the form of a
probability distribution, the “fan chart”. The BoE also publishes the location pa-
rameters mean, mode and median, as well as measures of dispersion and skewness.
The mode forecast is considered the central projection of the BoE, whereas the
mean forecast is mainly used to convey information about the prevailing forecast
risk. Actually, during the entire subsequent analysis, it will be of no importance
that the central projection is a mode forecast. It will only be important that the
central projection is not the mean forecast.
Macroeconomic forecasts are typically based on certain assumptions concerning
the future developments of variables which are considered exogenous with respect
to the forecasting models used. Exchange rates, oil prices and foreign demand for
domestic goods are typical examples for such variables in the context of macro-
econometric models. According to Britton et al. (1998), the BoE’s mode forecast
of inﬂation corresponds to the forecast obtained if the assumptions are based on
the most likely future values of these variables. In contrast to that, the mean fore-
3cast is based on the expected future values. If the density forecasts are symmetric,
most likely and expected future values coincide. If, however, the density forecasts
are asymmetric, most likely and expected future values dier. In the latter case,
in general the mean and mode forecasts of inﬂation dier as well.
If the mean forecast exceeds the mode forecast, one speaks of an upward risk
to the inﬂation forecast. A downward risk is present if the mean forecast is lower
than the mode forecast. Thus, risks are present if the BoE’s density forecast is
asymmetric. For further details, see Britton et al. (1998). In Figure 1, two of the
BoE’s density forecasts with risks are displayed. For their calculations, we make
use of the formulas given in Wallis (2004).
Our analysis uses the BoE’s inﬂation forecasts based on the assumption that
the o!cial Bank rate, i.e= the interest rate paid on commercial bank reserves follows
a path implied by market interest rates. In line with Elder et al. (2005), for the
purpose of forecast evaluations we consider this assumption more adequate than
the assumption of a constant o!cial Bank rate.
The inﬂation forecasts considered in our analysis range from the ﬁrst quarter of
1998 to the third quarter of 2007. Each of the BoE’s quarterly projections covers
the current and the subsequent 8 quarters. The data is displayed in Appendix A.
Note that in some quarters, mean and mode forecast coincide, so that the forecast
risk equals zero, i.e= there is no forecast risk or the forecast risks are balanced.
Until 2003, the BoE forecasted the inﬂation of the all items retail prices index
excluding mortgage interest payments (henceforth RPIX). Since 2004, it forecasts
the inﬂation of the consumer price index (henceforth CPI).3
The BoE also publishes risk forecasts for GDP. We do not study these forecasts
here, since the analysis of GDP risk forecasts would be more complicated due to the
eects of data revisions. Such revisions play a substantial role for the assessment
of the BoE’s GDP forecasts, as noted by Elder et al. (2005).
3When outturns are compared with forecasts, this change has of course to be taken into
account. For instance, an inﬂation forecast for the fourth quarter of 2004 has to be compared
with CPI inﬂation data if the forecast was made in 2004. If the forecast was made before 2004,
it must be compared with RPIX inﬂation data.
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Figure 1: Two of the BoE’s density forecasts for inﬂation. The forecast in the
left panel implies an upward risk (mean A mode), the one in the right panel a
downward risk (mean ? mode).
3 Forecast Optimality
In this section, we are concerned with the partial optimality of forecasts, where
partial optimality is deﬁned as in Diebold & Lopez (1996). As mentioned by
Diebold & Lopez (1996), the original concept of partial optimality refers to opti-
mality conditional on the information set being used by the forecaster and goes
back to Brown & Maital (1981). When we speak of optimality in this study, we
always mean partial optimality with respect to the information set that is given
by the independent variable(s) of a certain regression. Our tests for optimality
assume a loss function being quadratic in the forecast error.
3.1 Mean Forecast Optimality and Risk
It is well known that using the mean of a density forecast as the point forecast
minimizes the mean squared forecast error. In contrast to that, the loss function
which is minimized by the mode forecast is a rather special all-or-nothing loss
function as shown by Wallis (1999). Thus, the mean forecasts of the BoE should
5Table 1: Root mean squared errors of mode and mean forecasts
k 0123456 7 8
q 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31
RMSE of the forecasted...
... mode 0=16 0=25 0=32 0=39 0=47 0=50 0=48 0=44 0=45
... mean 0=17 0=27 0=35 0=42 0=48 0=50 0=51 0=50 0=52
dev. in % 5=7 5=9 7=1 6=4 2=20 =0 4=5 12=7 14=8
Note: k is the forecast horizon. q denotes the number of observations. dev. in %
gives the deviation of the RMSE of the mode forecast from the RMSE of the mean
forecast in %.
have a smaller mean squared forecast error than the mode forecasts.
The results for the root mean squared forecast error (RMSE) of the BoE’s
inﬂation forecasts displayed in Table 1, however, indicate the opposite. For 8 out
of 9 forecast horizons, the mode forecasts yield a smaller RMSE than the mean
forecasts.
This result is surprising. However, the observed negative deviations could be
statistically insigniﬁcant. Tests of the hypothesis that the RMSEs of mode and
mean forecasts dier would have to take into account that these forecasts are most
likely generated by nested models. This implies that we cannot use the standard
critical values of the test statistic proposed by Diebold & Mariano (1995), but
have to make modiﬁcations as described in West (2006). Yet, it could even be
that mode and mean forecasts come from identical models, and it is unclear how
to handle this issue. Therefore, instead of testing the dierence between RMSEs,
we employ a test for forecast optimality.
If the forecasts are optimal, we should not be able to reject the hypothesis
Kd
0 :( k =0 >k =1 >k =0 )in the regression





where |w+k denotes the inﬂation rate in period w + k, w>w+k denotes the mean
forecast made in w for w + k, pw>w+k is the corresponding mode forecast, %w>k is a
6zero-mean error term4 and k =0 >1>===>8 a positive integer denoting the forecast
horizon. For k =0 , the forecast is actually a nowcast for the current quarter.
Note that w>w+k  pw>w+k is a measure of the forecasted risk.A l s o t a k e i n t o
account that the mean and the mode forecast are based on the same information
set. Thus, the forecasted risk should not be signiﬁcant in this regression, since,
conditional on the information set used, the forecasted mean w>w+k is supposed to
minimize the variance of %w>k.
In order to isolate the eect of the inclusion of the risk forecast, we also test












0 are tested with an F-test.
Table 2: Results of tests for partial optimality of mean forecasts
k 012345678
q 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31
coe!cient estimates
k 0=19 0=40 0=73 1=25 2=26 2=89 2=91 2=70 2=71
(0=10) (0=19) (0=23) (0=20) (0=34) (0=48) (0=48) (0=50) (0=61)
k 0=92 0=84 0=71 0=48 0=01 0=30 0=29 0=17 0=16
(0=04) (0=08) (0=10) (0=10) (0=14) (0=20) (0=20) (0=21) (0=26)
k 1=58 1=61 1=74 1=38 0=50 2=09 0=77 0=37 0=35
(0=69) (0=57) (0=48) (0=39) (0=77) (0=74) (0=64) (0=44) (0=52)
s-values
Ke
0 0=22 0=06W 0=01WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW
Kd
0 0=06W 0=02WW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW
k =0 0 =03WW 0=01WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=52 0=01WWW 0=24 0=41 0=50
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. These are Newey-West (1987) standard errors.
The bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure proposed by Andrews (1991).
W,(WW,WWW) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 (5, 1) % signiﬁcance level. q
denotes the number of observations.
The results in Table 2 clearly indicate that using the forecasted risk signiﬁcantly
improves the forecasts for several horizons. For k =0 >===>3 and k =5 ,t h en u l l
of k =0can be rejected. In the light of the results obtained for the RMSEs, this
ﬁnding is not too surprising. Since the mode forecasts have lower RMSEs than the
4In what follows, all error terms have the zero-mean property.
7mean forecasts, and the mode forecasts are contained in the forecasted risk, the
forecasted risk can help to improve the mean forecast.5
The null of forecast optimality can be rejected at lower signiﬁcance levels with
(1) than with the reduced regression at least for k =0 >1>2. However, even with
the reduced regression the null can be rejected at a signiﬁcance level of 1%for
k  2.
3.2 Bias of Mode, Mean and Risk Forecasts
If tests reject the hypothesis of forecast optimality, this might be due to the pres-
ence of a bias in the forecasts. It is therefore interesting to test the hypothesis of


k =0in the equation







k is a constant and %

w>k is an error term. For the sake of completeness, we
d ot h es a m ef o rt h em o d ef o r e c a s t s ,i . e = we test the hypothesis of p
k =0in the
equation






k is a constant and %p
w>k is an error term.
Finally, it might be interesting to know whether the BoE is mainly concerned
with upward or downward risks to inﬂation. This question can be addressed by
testing u
k =0in the equation










w>k, can be serially
correlated.6
5In principle, we could also test forecast optimality by directly using the forecasted mode
pw>w+k instead of the forecasted risk w>w+k  pw>w+k in equation (1). Since, however, w>w+k and
pw>w+k are strongly correlated, this would result in multicollinearity.
6The presence of serial correlation in %u
w>k is caused by the serial corrrelation in the forecasted
risk w>w+k  pw>w+k. This serial correlation can be explained as follows: If there is a risk to the
forecast made in period w for the period w + k +1 , and this risk does not materialize until the
forecast in w +1is made, the risk for the period w + k +1persists. Thus, w>w+k+1  pw>w+k+1
and w+1>w+1+k pw+1>w+1+k are correlated. Since in addition risks are typically correlated over
horizons, i.e= w>w+k+1pw>w+k+1 is correlated with w>w+kpw>w+k, the forecast risks for a certain
8The results in Table 3 show that neither the mode forecasts nor the mean
forecasts have a signiﬁcant bias.7 The estimates for 

k and p
k are very similar,
both implying that the BoE slightly underpredicted inﬂation for k =0 >===>6 and
slightly overpredicted inﬂation for k =7 >8.
The estimates of u
k indicate that on average the BoE predicts upward risks to
inﬂation. The average risks increase with the forecast horizon k. However, these
average risks are very small, attaining at most 0=03 percentage points. Moreover,
the presence of a non-zero average risk is not signiﬁcant. Thus, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that, on average, the BoE forecasts balanced risks, i.e= no risks.
Note that the latter result does not imply any kind of optimality, but is purely
descriptive. If the true unconditional density of inﬂation was positively skewed,
its mean would exceed its mode, and hence, upward risks should be forecasted on
average. For the same reason, the absence of bias in the mode forecasts cannot
be evaluated. Only for the mean forecast, unbiasedness is a property of optimal
forecasts.
3.3 Risk Forecast Optimality
In Section 3.1, we have tested the optimality of mean forecasts with respect to
the information contained in the risk forecasts. In case of optimality, the risk
forecasts must not improve the mean forecasts. In the current section, our focus
will be somewhat dierent. We want to test the optimality of risk forecasts in a
more direct manner. In order to do so, we ask the question whether the central
projection, i.e= the mode forecast can be improved by taking the risk forecast into
account if agents have a quadratic loss function. If the risk forecasts have the
intended information content, such an improvement should be observed.
In order to evaluate the risk forecasts, we need a measure of realized risks. The
m e a s u r et h a tc o r r e s p o n d st ot h er i s kf o r e c a s t so ft h eB o Ei sg i v e nb yt h ed i erence
between realized inﬂation and the mode forecast. If the risk forecasts are optimal,
horizon k are serially correlated as well. However, the serial correlation of %u
w>k turns out to be




7For the mean forecasts, this result is in line with, for instance, Clements (2004), Wallis (2004)
and Elder et al. (2005).
9Table 3: Results of regressions to test for bias
k 01234567 8




k 0=01 0=04 0=05 0=08 0=10 0=09 0=05 0=04 0=13
(0=03) (0=05) (0=07) (0=10) (0=12) (0=14) (0=15) (0=15) (0=16)
p
k 0=01 0=05 0=07 0=10 0=12 0=12 0=08 0=01 0=10
(0=03) (0=05) (0=06) (0=09) (0=12) (0=13) (0=13) (0=13) (0=13)
u
k 0=01 0=01 0=02 0=02 0=02 0=03 0=03 0=03 0=03




k =0 0 =78 0=46 0=45 0=41 0=43 0=51 0=72 0=80 0=43
p
k =0 0 =61 0=31 0=29 0=27 0=30 0=37 0=56 0=93 0=44
u
k =0 0 =36 0=26 0=21 0=14 0=12 0=13 0=31 0=46 0=51
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. These are Newey-West (1987) standard errors.
The bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure proposed by Andrews (1991).
W,(WW,WWW) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 (5, 1) % signiﬁcance level. q
denotes the number of observations.
we have
|w+k  pw>w+k = w>w+k  pw>w+k + %w>k (2)
where %w>k is an error term. The term |w+kpw>w+k is the forecast error with respect
to the central projection, but in the context of the subsequent analysis it should
be regarded as measure for the realized risk,a sw>w+k  pw>w+k is the measure of
the forecasted risk.





%w>k. This equation states that in case of risk forecast optimality, the mode forecast




. If the mode
forecast was not shifted towards the mean by this amount, the resulting mean
squared forecast error would exceed the variance of %w>k.
It is also important to note that we do not regress the true risk on the forecasted
risk. The true risk is given by H [\w+k]  P [\w+k],w h e r eP [\w+k] denotes the
mode of \w+k.8 S i n c ew ed on o th a v ea ne s t i m a t ef o rP [\w+k],w ec a n n o tm e a s u r e
8We adopt the common convention to use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase
letters for their realizations.
10the true risk. It should be stressed that nothing in equation (2) relates the true
mode P [\w+k] to the forecasted mode pw>w+k. This becomes especially clear if we
suppose, for instance, that an institution simply publishes a constant f as its central
projection. In this case, equation (2) would become |w+k  f = w>w+k  f + %w>k.
The forecasted risk would be given by w>w+k f, and the realized risk by |w+k f.
For the mentioned equation, it does not matter whether f is supposed to be the
mode, median or any other point related to the distribution of \w+k. For optimal
risk forecasts, it only matters that the forecasted risk w>w+kf equals the expected
realized risk Hw [\w+k  f].
Based on equation (2), it is possible to run Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions for
the risk forecasts. That is, one can estimate the coe!cients k and k of the
equation





and test whether k =0and k =1hold. However, we will not consider the
joint hypothesis (k =0 >k =1 ) , but test the hypothesis of the ﬁrst (k =0 )and
of the second condition for optimality (k =1 )separately. This will turn out to
deliver more insights than a joint test.
Moreover, we will test the hypothesis of qualitatively correct information con-
tent of the risk forecasts. This test is based on the assumption that k =0holds
and involves tests of two hypotheses. The ﬁrst hypothesis is given by k =0 .I f
the risk forecasts have an information content, this hypothesis should be rejected.
The second hypothesis is given by k A 0. If the risk forecasts have a qualitatively
correct information content, this hypothesis should not be rejected.
With tests of two hypotheses, four cases can occur. In Table 4, we list these
cases and their implications. They are ranked according to their desirability. Case
I is clearly the most desirable case. Case II is less desirable, but not being able to
reject k =0could not only be caused by lack of information content, but also, for
example, by a too small sample size. Cases III and IV are the least desirable ones.
In principle, they have identical implications, but in case III, the conﬁrmation of
the alternative hypothesis of a qualitatively adverse information content is weaker,
since it occurs at a larger signiﬁcance level.9
9Note that in case I, if at a given signiﬁcance level k =0is rejected and k A 0 is not,
11Table 4: Implications of test results for information content
case k=0 kA 0 implication for risk forecasts
I rejected not rejected qualitatively correct information content conﬁrmed
II not rejected not rejected null of no information content not rejected
III not rejected rejected qualitatively adverse information content conﬁrmed
IV rejected rejected qualitatively adverse information content conﬁrmed
The estimation results are displayed in the upper panel of Table 5. While the
k’v are all close to zero, the k’v are mostly negative. This indicates that, for a
period with a forecasted upward risk, a downward risk is more likely to materialize.
The lower panel of Table 5 contains the s- v a l u e so ft e s t so ft h ev a r i o u sn u l l
hypotheses. Here and in the following, we use a signiﬁcance level of 10 %. It turns
out that the null of k =0cannot be rejected for any forecast horizon k. However,
the null of k =1 ,i . e = of the second condition for optimality is rejected for all
horizons except for k =4 >5>6 at very low signiﬁcance levels. For k =4 >5>6,t h e
largest standard errors of k are found, so that inference is relatively di!cult for
these horizons.
Since k =0cannot be rejected, tests of the null hypothesis of qualitatively
correct information content can be conducted. They yield rather disappointing
results. Not for a single forecast horizon case I is found, i.e= for no forecast horizon
the presence of qualitatively correct information content is conﬁrmed. For the
horizons k =0 >4>5>6>8 we cannot reject the null of no information content. For
the other horizons, we even ﬁnd a qualitatively adverse information content of the
risk forecasts.
In summary, the risk forecasts appear to fulﬁll the ﬁrst condition for optimal-
ity, but the intended information content, i.e= a qualitatively correct information
content is not present in these forecasts. Rather they have either no information
content, or even a qualitatively adverse information content.
In principle, the puzzling results with respect to the tests of the k’v could be
related to the presence of a constant, albeit insigniﬁcant, in equation (3).I m a g i n e
this implies that k ? 0 is rejected. Therefore, in case I we cannot only state that the null of
qualitatively correct information content cannot be rejected. We can even claim that, since the
null of qualitatively adverse information content can be rejected, the alternative hypothesis of
qualitatively correct information content is conﬁrmed.
12Table 5: Results of Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions
k 01234 5 678
q 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31
coe!cient estimates
k 0=02 0=06 0=09 0=13 0=14 0=12 0=09 0=01 0=08
(0=03) (0=04) (0=06) (0=08) (0=10) (0=13) (0=12) (0=12) (0=12)
k 0=77 1=00 1=35 1=47 0=59 0=13 0=53 0=82 0=50
(0=75) (0=67) (0=75) (0=73) (1=03) (1=41) (1=08) (0=62) (0=56)
s-values
k =0 0 =49 0=18 0=17 0=12 0=20 0=37 0=46 0=93 0=50
k =1 0 =02WW 0=01WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=13 0=54 0=17 0=01WWW 0=01WW
k =0 0 =31 0=15 0=08W 0=05W 0=57 0=93 0=63 0=19 0=38
k A 00 =16 0=07W 0=04WW 0=03WW 0=29 0=54 0=31 0=10W 0=19
case II III IV IV II II II III II
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. These are Newey-West (1987) standard errors.
The bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure proposed by Andrews (1991).
W,(WW,WWW) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 (5, 1) % signiﬁcance level. q
denotes the number of observations.
that the risk forecasts for three periods are given by {0=5>0=5>1},a n dt h er e a l -
izations are {0=3>0=6>0=4}. In this case, a forecasted upward risk would mostly be
correctly associated with the realization of an upward risk. However, a regression
a c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n(3) would yield k =0 =49 and k = 0=16,w h e r ek (and
also k)w o u l dn o td i er signiﬁcantly from zero. Yet, a regression with the restric-
tion k =0would yield k =0 =17 which could be considered a more reasonable
result. Therefore, we also estimate equation (3) with the restriction k =0 .T h e
results are displayed in the Table 6.
It turns out that the signs of the k’v are identical to those in the unrestricted
estimation. The null of k =1is rejected for the same horizons as before. Again
case I does not occur for any horizon, so there is no evidence for a qualitatively cor-
rect information content. However, in contrast to the estimations with a constant,
now case II is found for all horizons except k =2 . For this horizon, there is evi-
dence for qualitatively adverse information content. Yet, for several other horizons
the s-values of the tests of k A 0 exceed 10 % by a small amount only, thereby
again suggesting the possibility of a qualitatively adverse information content.
13Table 6: Results of Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions with restriction k =0
k 012345678
q 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31
coe!cient estimates
k 0=69 0=80 1=08 1=07 0=17 0=50 0=35 0=80 0=58
(0=78) (0=82) (0=74) (0=85) (1=18) (1=46) (1=13) (0=63) (0=50)
s-values
k =1 0 =04WW 0=03WW 0=01WWW 0=02WW 0=33 0=73 0=24 0=01WWW 0=00WWW
k =0 0 =38 0=33 0=16 0=22 0=89 0=73 0=76 0=21 0=25
k A 00 =19 0=17 0=08W 0=11 0=44 0=63 0=38 0=11 0=13
case II II III II II II II II II
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. These are Newey-West (1987) standard errors.
The bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure proposed by Andrews (1991).
W,(WW,WWW) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 (5, 1) % signiﬁcance level. q
denotes the number of observations.
In summary, the analysis shows that the risk forecasts are not optimal. It is also
highly probable that they lack qualitatively correct information content. Rather,
they appear to have either no information content or even an adverse information
content. The evidence for the latter phenomenon is not particularly strong, but
due to the small sample size, we cannot discriminate more clearly between both
alternatives.
3.4 Interpretation of the Test Results
It is important to understand that the results found in the previous section are not
a consequence of the results found in Section 3.1. In that section, we found that
the mean forecasts can be improved by considering the forecasted risk, and that
the mode forecasts have lower RMSEs than the mean forecasts. These facts do not
imply that the risk forecasts have no information content or an adverse informa-
tion content, i.e= t h a tt h em o d ef o r e c a s t sc a n n o tb ei m p r o v e db yc o n s i d e r i n gt h e
forecasted risk, or that the mode forecasts can only be improved by considering
the reversed forecasted risk.
In order to clarify this issue, consider the densities and the mean and mode
































case D, t = 2
Figure 2: Four cases of mean and mode forecasts for two periods.
The dotted lines are the true densities of \1 and \2. The solid lines indicate the mean
forecasts w3k>w, the dashed lines indicate the mode forecasts pw3k>w.
that their mode and mean coincide at zero. We plot forecasts for two periods,
w =1and w =2and distinguish between the four cases A, B, C and D.
In case A, the risk forecasts w3k>w  pw3k>w have the right sign and the correct
size. With respect to our analysis, in this case mean forecasts and risk forecasts
are optimal.10 In case B, the risk forecasts w3k>w  pw3k>w have the right sign,
but they are exaggerated. That is, for w =1 , upward risks are present and are
forecasted, and for w =2 , downward risk are present and are forecasted, but both
risks are too large. In case C, the mode forecasts are actually equal to the mean
10Of course, the mode forecast does not coincide with the true mode, but, as mentioned above,
this does not matter for our analyses.
15o ft h et r u ed e n s i t y ,s ot h er i s kf o r e c a s t sc a n n o ti m p r o v et h em o d ef o r e c a s t s . I n
case D, the forecasted risks have the wrong signs. This could be interpreted as an
exaggeration of risks already present in the mode forecast. For the mean forecasts,
these risks are then exaggerated even further, leading to wrong signs of the risk
forecasts.
In all four cases, mean and mode forecasts are unbiased. The same holds for
t h er i s kf o r e c a s t s . I nt h et h r e ec a s e sB ,Ca n dD ,t h em o d ef o r e c a s t sh a v ea
smaller RMSE than the mean forecasts, because the mode forecasts are closer to
the mean of the true density. Thus, for these three cases, we would obtain the
results found in Section 3.1. However, case B cannot be reconciled with the results
of Section 3.3, since case B would correspond to case I in Table 4. Yet, case I is
never observed. In contrast to that, case C can be reconciled with case II, and
case D can be reconciled with cases III and IV.
Thus, the results found in Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 suggest that the mode
forecasts are closer to the mean of the true densities than the mean forecasts.
Moreover, the mode forecasts might be improved by shifting them away from the
forecasted mean. The latter possibility suggests that the probability of certain
r i s k sa se . g = exchange rate changes could already be overestimated in the mode
forecast. In any case, for economic agents with a loss function being quadratic in
the forecast error, the BoE’s mean forecasts do not minimize these losses.
4R o b u s t n e s s C h e c k s
4.1 Risk Forecast Optimality - A Qualitative Analysis
In order to shed further light on the performance of the BoE’s risk forecasts, we
conduct an analysis of their qualitative performance. If the lack of information
content or the adverse information content found above is mainly driven by outliers,
i.e= mainly driven by very few periods in which large upward [downward] risks
were forecasted, but large downward [upward] risks materialized, the qualitative
performance of the risk forecasts could be expected to be considerably better than
their quantitative performance.
Therefore, we regard all periods for which the BoE saw a forecast risk and
16Table 7: Qualitative performance of risk forecasts
k 012345678all
number of risk forecasts 19 19 19 18 18 26 25 26 24 194
s h a r eo ff a i l u r e si n% 58 74 63 72 67 58 72 65 54 64
share of successes in % 42 26 37 28 33 42 28 35 46 36
failure-success ratio 1=42 =81 =72 =62 =01 =42 =61 =91 =21 =8
compare the directions of these risks (downward or upward) with the outturns
(below or above the mode forecast). If an upward [downward] risk was forecasted,
and the outturn was above [below] the mode forecast, we count this as a successful
risk forecast. Otherwise, the risk forecast is counted as a failure. In Table 7, we
show the share of failures and of successes. Both shares add up to 1. We also
report the ratio of failures to successes.
Obviously, the qualitative risk forecasts do not perform well either. For all
forecast horizons, the failure-success ratio exceeds 1, ranging from 1=2 for k =8
to 2=8 for k =1 . Considering all risk forecasts, the failure-success ratio attains
av a l u eo f1=8. Thus, there is no evidence of correct information content of the
qualitative risk forecasts. Rather, the results indicate the presence of an adverse
information content.
In order to test hypotheses about information content, one could think of set-
ting up a (2 × 2) contingency table for each horizon, and then use a chi-square
or a related test. The categories of the table would be forecasted upward and
downward risk, and materialized upward or downward risk, i.e= outturns above or
below the mode forecast. However, the tests mentioned do not take the time-series
context of the data into account. This issue is emphasized by Christoersen (1998)
and Pesaran & Timmermann (2006). The inference would be distorted by serial
correlation of the data.
To overcome this problem, Pesaran & Timmermann (2006) propose to trans-
form the data to sequences of 1’s and 0’s, to run standard regressions and to use
heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimators for infer-







1 if |w+k  pw>w+k A 0
0 if |w+k  pw>w+k ? 0







1 if w>w+k  pw>w+k A 0
0 if w>w+k  pw>w+k ? 0
qd if |w+k  pw>w+k =0
where qd denotes a missing value.
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not contain missing values. If there were no missing values, Ak would be an (q × q)
identity matrix. If, for example, there was no risk forecast for the ﬁrst forecast of
horizon k, i.e= in the case |1+kp1>1+k =0 , p would equal q1 and Ak would be
given by the (p × q) matrix Ak =[ 0p Ip],w h e r e0p denotes an (p × 1) vector
of 0’s and Ip denotes the (p × p) identity matrix.




>+k with  =1 >2>===>p,
we run the regression
|
t
>+k = k + k{
t
>+k + %>k (4)
where %>k is an error term. In this regression only the value of k is of interest.
Av a l u eo f1 corresponds to a qualitatively optimal11 information content, a value
of 0 to no information content, and a value below 0 to an adverse information





>+k, |k|  1 holds. Hence, as emphasized by Harding & Pagan
(2006), testing k =1would mean testing on the boundary of the parameter
11Qualitative optimality is achieved by the minimzation of a quadratic loss function, where
the argument of the loss function is a qualitative variable.
18Table 8: Results of regressions with qualitative variables
k 012345678
p 19 19 19 18 18 26 25 26 24
coe!cient estimates
k 0=15 0=52 0=36 0=58 0=33 0=13 0=40 0=30 0=08
(0=22) (0=20) (0=22) (0=13) (0=25) (0=23) (0=17) (0=16) (0=23)
s-values
k =0 0 =50 0=02WW 0=12 0=00WWW 0=20 0=59 0=02WW 0=07W 0=72
k A 00 =25 0=01WWW 0=06 0=00WWW 0=10 0=29 0=01WW 0=04WW 0=36
case II IV II IV II II IV IV II
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. These are Newey-West (1987) standard errors.
The bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure proposed by Andrews (1991).
W,(WW,WWW) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 (5, 1) % signiﬁcance level. p
denotes the number of observations.
space, leading to a non-standard distribution of the test statistic.
The estimation results are displayed in Table 8. For all forecast horizons, the
estimated k’s are negative. For the horizons k =0 >2>4>5>8 we cannot reject the
null of no information content. For the other horizons, the presence of qualitatively
adverse information content is conﬁrmed.12
To sum up, the qualitative analysis conﬁrms the results of the quantitative
analysis. There are no signs of qualitatively correct information content of the risk
forecasts, and there might even exist a qualitatively adverse information content.
4.2 Stability Over Time
The BoE publishes density forecasts since February 1996. At that time, to the
best of our knowledge the BoE was the only institution to publish macroeconomic
projections of this kind, so that the BoE could not draw on others institutions’
experiences. It is therefore quite likely that the BoE has gone through a learning
process. If this process was still ongoing in February 1998 and later, the results





>+k can be expected to cause breaks in the autocorrelation structure of these variables. The
calculation of standard errors might suer from this problem. Therefore, we vary the bandwith
parameters of the Newey-West procedure between 0 and 6, ﬁnding that the standard errors
remain broadly unchanged.
19of our analysis might be aected by it. In this case, it would be more appropriate
to start the analysis at that point in time where the learning process came to an
end.
Looking at the forecasts, there indeed appear to be signs of a learning process.
Until May 2001, in every projection risks were forecasted for at least 8 out of 9
forecast horizons. However, from August 2001 onwards, 19 out of 25 projections
had at most 4 out of 9 horizons for which risks were forecasted. In these 19
projections, risks were forecasted for k =5 >===>8, i.e= the longer term, but not for
k =0 >===>4, i.e= the shorter term. Thus, the BoE seems to have become more
cautious with respect to its risk forecasts, especially in the shorter term. Yet, it is
not completely clear if August 2001 should be considered as the breakpoint.
Until May 2001, the share of forecasts with risks was 94 %. For forecasts from
August 2001 onwards, this share equals only 40 %. The dierence between these
shares amounts to 55 %. If we considered May 2002 instead of August 2001 as
the breakpoint, this dierence would reach its largest possible value of 58 %.13 We
therefore assume that the switch to a more cautious risk forecasting regime might
have occurred in August 2001 or in May 2002. Increased caution could of course
translate into changes of the risk forecasting performance.
It would therefore be interesting to split the data sample in August 2001 and
May 2002 and to investigate whether the information content of the risk forecasts
diers among the two subsamples. Unfortunately, for many horizons there are
only very few risk forecasts diering from zero after these breakpoints, the lowest
number being three if May 2002 is considered as the breakpoint. An analysis based
on individual forecast horizons would thus not deliver many useful insights. Hence,
we decide to pool all forecast horizons and to perform a panel analysis.
In the static panel model, we consider the forecast publication dates as the time
variable and the forecast horizon as the group variable. Thus, the panel model
emerging from equation (3) is given by
|w+k  pw>w+k =  + (w>w+k  pw>w+k)+xw>k> (5)
13Until February 2002, the share of forecasts with risks was 92 %. For forecasts from May
2002 onwards, this share equals 34 %.
20where xw>k denotes the error component. This random eects speciﬁcation is sup-
ported by a Hausman test. Strictly speaking, we set k =  +k,w h e r ek is the
speciﬁc disturbance. With assuming a remainder disturbance %w>k,w ed e ﬁ n et h e
error component as xw>k = k + %w>k. The intercept  is treated as the mean of
the random eects. We estimate model (5) by Generalized Least Squares (hence-
forth GLS), assuming heteroskedasticity and imposing a panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order
autoregressive (henceforth AR(1)) process for the error term. Furthermore, cross-
sectional correlation is explicitly taken into account. The latter option, however,
requires the panel to be strictly balanced. Therefore, observations after August
2005 are deleted, resulting in a panel containing 279 entries rather than 315 for
the unbalanced panel. Yet, with a glance at the data we remark that only three
forecasts with risks are excluded.
GLS estimations are performed on the complete balanced panel data and on
four subsamples. The four subsamples are determined by the two possible break-
points. We set  to zero since it turns out not to dier signiﬁcantly from this value
in the full-sample estimation.14
The resulting estimates displayed in Table 9 show stark dierences depending
o nt h eb r e a k p o i n td a t eu s e d .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h er i s kf o r e c a s t sp u b -
lished in November 2001 and February 2002 were very successful. If we consider
t h eb r e a k p o i n tt ob eA u g u s t2 0 0 1 ,t h er i s kf o r e c a s t sh a v ei m p r o v e d .W h i l et h e r e
was an adverse information content before the breakpoint, the null of no informa-
tion content cannot be rejected after the breakpoint.15 However, the risk forecasts
still do not have a qualitatively correct information content, with  being smaller
than zero. If May 2002 is considered as the breakpoint, the risk forecasts have
deteriorated. The second condition for optimality, i.e==1is rejected in all
samples.
Thus, there is no evidence that increased caution with respect to the risk
forecasts has led to a qualitatively correct information content of these forecasts.
14T h ee s t i m a t eo f is 0.020, its standard error being 0.024.
15One could suppose that standard errors might be distorted by the use of a panel-speciﬁc
AR(1)-process for the error term, since it would be more appropriate to employ moving-average
processes with orders related to the respective forecast horizons. However, LM tests ﬁnd evidence
for serial correlation of the residuals only for the forecast horizons k =3 >4.I n a n y c a s e , n o
estimation routine being able to handle cross-sectional correlation and moving-average or higher-
order AR(n)- p r o c e s s e si sk n o w nt ou s .
21Table 9: Static panel estimation results
full sample old regime old regime new regime new regime
until until since since
May 2001 Feb 2002 Aug 2001 May 2002
q 279 126 153 153 126
s.r.f. 59 % 94 % 92 % 47 % 40 %
coe!cient estimates
 0=39 0=70 0=33 0=06 1=72
(0=24) (0=20) (0=23) (0=33) (0=49)
s-values
 =1 0 =00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW 0=00WWW
 =0 0 =11 0=00WWW 0=16 0=86 0=00WWW
A00 =05W 0=00WWW 0=08W 0=43 0=00WWW
case III IV III II IV
Note: GLS estimation with AR(1)-process for error terms, and cross-sectional cor-
relation. Standard error are in parentheses. W,(WW,WWW) denotes rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 10 (5, 1) % signiﬁcance level. q denotes the number of obser-
vations. s.r.f. denotes the share of risk forecasts. The s.r.f.’s dier from those
mentioned in the text due to the dierent end date of the sample (August 2005
instead of August 2007).
For the whole sample, there is again weak evidence of a qualitatively adverse
information content.
5 Possible Explanations for Poor Risk Forecast-
ing Performance
5.1 Endogeneity of Outturns
If inﬂation reacts to the BoE’s forecasts, then it could of course happen that
estimations of equations like (3) yield misleading results. Consider, for example,
the case of forecasted upward risks to inﬂation. In this case, economic agents could
anticipate a risk of rising interest rates. In response to this risk, economic activity
could be dampened, leading to lower demand and, consequently, to lower inﬂation.
Then, even if the forecasted upward risk to inﬂation materializes, inﬂation could
22still be lower than forecasted. In this case, the risk forecasts could even have
an adverse information content. The same would happen if the BoE actually set
interest rates according to its risk forecasts.
If there is a transmission channel from forecasts to realizations, then the analy-
sis conducted above could easily come to wrong conclusions. However, the pre-
vailing opinion in economics is that inﬂation can only be inﬂuenced with a lag by
monetary policymakers. Actually, this is the reason why central banks are con-
cerned with forecasting. They know that their current decisions will not aect the
economy instantaneously, but in the future.
Taking this fact into account, it should be clear that, if a transmission chan-
nel from forecasts to realizations exists, its importance should increase with the
forecasting horizon. Therefore, we should be able to assess the importance of
this channel by regressing the k’s of our regressions on the respective k’s. If
the transmission channel is important, the coe!cient with respect to k should be
negative, because for short horizons, the k’s should correctly measure the infor-
mation content of the risk forecasts and should therefore be relatively large. For
larger horizons, the transmission channel would become more important, lowering
t h ev a l u e so ft h ek’s.16
Therefore, we estimate the equation
k = d + ek + %k
where %k is an error term. We estimate this equation for the k’s of the standard
Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (3), of the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression with k =0
and of the equation with qualitative variables (4). The results of these regressions
are displayed in Table 10.
None of the e’s is negative, indicating that the transmission channel from fore-
casts to realizations does not play a major role. In any case, the negative signs
of the k’s for short forecasting horizons could not have been explained by this
16Of course, there could also be another reason why the k’s decline with the forecasting
horizon. The di!culty of forecasting for longer horizons tends to lower the k’s for longer
horizons in standard Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions. However, if the k’s do not decrease as k
increases, this can be interpreted as unimportance of the transmission channel even if there is
another reason why the k’s should decrease.
23Table 10: Results of regression of slope coe!cients on forecast horizon
k’s from e
(3) 0=08 (0=21)
(3), k =0 0 =06 (0=41)
(4) 0=02 (0=35)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
channel.
As endogeneity of outturns is the only explanation we could have oered for
a possibly adverse information content of risk forecasts, the evidence for adverse
information content found above remains puzzling.
5.2 Problems to Anticipate Risks in Determinants
Risks to inﬂation or other aggregates are commonly identiﬁed via risks to variables
that determine these aggregates. For example, an upward risk to inﬂation might
be caused by an upward risk to oil prices, to the value added tax rate or by a risk
of depreciation of the domestic currency. Thus, in order to correctly forecast the
risks to inﬂation, one has to forecast the risks to these determinants. Actually, the
process of risk forecasting might be thought of as a three-step process, where in
the ﬁrst step, one has to identify those determinants which are subject to forecast
risks. In the second step, one has to quantify these risks, and in the third step,
their impact on the aggregate has to be calculated.
While for the third step, models are in general available, the ﬁrst two steps
appear especially demanding. The ﬁrst step requires to identify variables whose
most likely future paths (represented by the mode forecast) dier from their ex-
pected future paths (represented by the mean forecast). This might be possible
for ﬁscal variables like the value added tax rate, where one could imagine that a
certain rate is likely, but that an alternative rate is discussed by the government
a tt h et i m et h ef o r e c a s ti sm a d e .F o rv a r i a bles like oil prices and exchange rates,
however, this task is extremely challenging. Even if the identiﬁcation of risks is
successful, the quantiﬁcation appears equally di!cult. But if the identiﬁed risks to
the determinants are opposing risks to the aggregate, an incorrect quantiﬁcation
can easily lead to a qualitatively ﬂawed risk forecast for the aggregate.
24Without further knowledge about the assumptions made about risks of determi-
nants in the BoE’s forecasts, we cannot verify whether the di!culties in identifying
and quantifying these risks are decisive for the performance of the risk forecasts
for inﬂation. However, the BoE gives narrative support to this supposition. In the
Inﬂation Report from August 2000 the BoE, referring to inﬂationary developments
from 1997 to 1999, states that “In general, the modal inﬂation forecast has been
closer to actual outturns than the mean projection. This is because the MPC
judged the risks to the central projection to be on the upside, largely because of
the risk that the sterling exchange rate might depreciate sharply. Up to 2000 Q2
this did not occur; indeed, the exchange rate tended to be higher than the central
assumption.” (pp= 63-64).
Although we cannot quantify the eect of errors in assumptions about risks in
determinants, the reasoning given above and the cited statement by the BoE lead
us to consider this eect as the major reason for the BoE’s poor risk forecasting
performance. If this is the major reason, then the appearance of an adverse infor-
mation content for some of the forecast horizons would be related to the sample
size of the analysis. With a larger sample size, one would then expect stronger
evidence for the hypothesis of no information content of the risk forecasts.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Macroeconomic risk assessments play an important role in the forecasts of many
institutions. However, to the best of our knowledge their performance has not
been investigated yet. In this work, we study the BoE’s risk forecasts for inﬂation.
We ﬁnd that these forecasts do not contain the intended information. Rather, they
either have no information content, or maybe even an adverse information content.
The poor performance of the risk forecasts is related to the fact that the mode
forecasts have smaller RMSEs than the mean forecasts. Our results imply that
economic agents with a loss function being quadratic in the forecast error should
not use the mean forecasts. Instead, in order to attain the smallest expected loss,
they should either use the mode forecasts and ignore the risk forecast. Or they
even should, starting from the mode forecast, move into the opposite direction of
the risk forecast. In any case, they can expect a lower loss when they use the
25BoE’s mode forecast instead of the mean forecast.
We ﬁnd that the poor risk forecasting performance cannot be explained by out-
liers. We also ﬁnd that in 2001 or 2002, the BoE changed its risk forecast pattern,
and has apparently acted with more caution since then. Risks have only been
forecasted relatively rarely since this change. However, we ﬁnd that the increase
in caution does not translate into a qualitatively correct information content of
the risk forecasts.
The most convincing reason for the BoE’s poor risk forecasting performance
seems to be given by the di!culty to identify and quantify the forecast risks in the
determinants of inﬂation. This, however, can only explain the lack of information
content. We cannot oer conclusive explanations for a possibly adverse information
content.
If our results are representative for macroeconomic risk forecasts, they call
into question the common practice of adding risk assessments to forecasts. The
only obvious rationale for publishing risk forecasts would then be the forecast
institutions’ desire for shaping the expectations of economic agents. However, this
can only work properly as long as economic agents believe that the risk forecasts
have the intended information content.
Yet, it might also be that risk forecasts are actually neither meant to deliver
correct results nor to shape expectations, but rather aim to reach a “consensus”
among those responsible for the forecast. By means of risk forecasts, it is possible
t oi n t e g r a t ed i s a g r e e i n gv i e w so nf u t u r ed e v e l o p m e n t si n t oas i n g l ef o r e c a s t .I fa
minority of an institution’s forecasting committee does not agree with the view of
the majority, the view of the majority could be published as the central projection,
while the view of the minority could be represented in the form of risk assessments.
In this case, our results imply that, for the sake of forecast optimality, it would be
better to ignore the minority’s view.
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28A Appendix: Mode and Mean Forecasts and Re-
alizations
date modes of inﬂation forecasts realizations
k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 RPIX CPI
1998 Feb 2.60 2.63 2.43 2.43 2.45 2.44 2.57 2.70 2.87 2.59
May 2.83 2.35 2.35 2.40 2.37 2.31 2.29 2.33 2.44 2.94
Aug 2.51 2.56 2.68 2.82 2.86 2.77 2.68 2.57 2.52 2.55
Nov 2.54 2.54 2.69 2.73 2.62 2.65 2.67 2.73 2.79 2.53
1999 Feb 2.47 2.52 2.55 2.60 2.55 2.58 2.62 2.66 2.92 2.53
May 2.48 2.41 2.37 2.22 2.25 2.27 2.24 2.37 2.42 2.30
Aug 2.31 2.27 2.10 1.98 1.85 1.85 1.97 2.08 2.29 2.17
Nov 2.20 2.13 2.06 2.02 1.83 1.72 1.78 2.12 2.41 2.16
2000 Feb 1.93 1.97 1.93 2.01 2.28 2.40 2.40 2.37 2.28 2.09
May 1.88 1.93 2.09 2.19 2.44 2.47 2.44 2.39 2.39 2.07
Aug 2.38 2.28 2.27 2.39 2.48 2.61 2.65 2.66 2.66 2.13
Nov 2.36 2.33 2.22 2.19 2.19 2.20 2.40 2.51 2.62 2.11
2001 Feb 1.94 1.93 1.89 1.90 2.11 2.21 2.33 2.52 2.73 1.87
May 1.90 1.90 1.92 1.91 1.95 2.05 2.19 2.45 2.62 2.26
Aug 2.31 2.17 2.17 1.91 1.96 2.11 2.28 2.34 2.34 2.38
Nov 2.00 2.03 1.85 2.06 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.21 2.31 1.95
2002 Feb 2.14 1.87 1.95 2.09 2.16 2.13 2.15 2.21 2.16 2.37
May 2.02 2.08 2.22 2.19 2.01 2.00 2.10 2.10 2.23 1.86
Aug 1.84 2.25 2.25 2.26 2.30 2.27 2.31 2.38 2.47 1.98
Nov 2.64 2.71 2.71 2.72 2.42 2.43 2.44 2.53 2.56 2.61
2003 Feb 2.78 2.90 2.99 2.79 2.69 2.62 2.57 2.46 2.50 2.89
May 3.09 2.90 2.64 2.39 2.35 2.40 2.41 2.52 2.55 2.91
Aug 2.85 2.58 2.31 2.32 2.29 2.28 2.36 2.48 2.61 2.85
Nov 2.72 2.55 2.63 2.65 2.59 2.50 2.37 2.38 2.42 2.60
2004 Feb 1.34 1.60 1.60 1.71 1.77 1.68 1.71 1.76 1.87 2.30 1.25
May 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.43 1.60 1.71 1.76 1.98 2.13 2.17 1.45
Aug 1.18 1.22 1.32 1.38 1.53 1.53 1.64 1.96 2.01 2.11 1.24
Nov 1.18 1.20 1.36 1.57 1.65 1.73 1.84 1.95 2.03 2.26 1.44
2005 Feb 1.54 1.58 1.65 1.73 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.09 2.15 2.20 1.75
May 1.98 2.06 2.10 2.01 1.86 1.90 1.93 1.96 2.00 2.23 1.94
Aug 2.16 2.30 2.19 2.01 1.91 1.81 1.94 2.13 2.18 2.39 2.45
Nov 2.23 2.16 2.03 1.85 1.77 1.81 1.84 1.89 1.95 2.26 2.13
2006 Feb 1.96 1.94 1.97 2.00 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.04 2.03 1.92
May 2.27 2.19 2.33 2.35 2.12 2.10 2.09 2.06 2.01 2.20
Aug 2.32 2.71 2.76 2.56 2.37 2.19 2.20 2.11 2.05 2.39
Nov 2.56 2.68 2.36 2.06 2.03 2.00 1.98 1.97 1.98 2.78
2007 Feb 2.90 2.56 2.24 2.02 1.79 1.83 1.88 1.93 2.00 2.88
May 2.52 2.25 2.06 1.95 1.83 1.79 1.88 1.92 1.98 2.64
Aug 2.07 2.10 2.10 2.05 2.03 2.04 1.99 1.99 2.00 1.75
Note: Until 2003 RPIX forecasts, from 2004 CPI forecasts
29date means of inﬂation forecasts realizations
k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 RPIX CPI
1998 Feb 2.64 2.69 2.51 2.52 2.54 2.60 2.80 3.00 3.25 2.59
May 2.74 2.20 2.16 2.18 2.15 2.22 2.33 2.50 2.74 2.94
Aug 2.56 2.66 2.81 2.96 3.00 2.94 2.89 2.81 2.79 2.55
Nov 2.57 2.62 2.79 2.85 2.75 2.73 2.69 2.70 2.70 2.53
1999 Feb 2.49 2.56 2.60 2.65 2.61 2.60 2.60 2.59 2.81 2.53
May 2.51 2.46 2.45 2.31 2.36 2.40 2.39 2.54 2.61 2.30
Aug 2.35 2.35 2.21 2.12 2.00 1.98 2.07 2.16 2.35 2.17
Nov 2.19 2.10 2.03 1.98 1.78 1.64 1.63 1.91 2.17 2.16
2000 Feb 1.96 2.02 2.00 2.10 2.38 2.51 2.52 2.51 2.43 2.09
May 1.89 1.95 2.12 2.24 2.49 2.50 2.44 2.36 2.34 2.07
Aug 2.38 2.28 2.27 2.39 2.48 2.59 2.60 2.58 2.56 2.13
Nov 2.37 2.35 2.26 2.23 2.24 2.24 2.42 2.52 2.62 2.11
2001 Feb 1.92 1.90 1.85 1.85 2.06 2.12 2.18 2.31 2.48 1.87
May 1.88 1.87 1.88 1.87 1.90 1.98 2.09 2.32 2.47 2.26
Aug 2.31 2.17 2.17 1.91 1.96 2.08 2.20 2.22 2.19 2.38
Nov 2.10 2.17 2.02 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.41 2.51 1.95
2002 Feb 2.24 2.01 2.12 2.28 2.36 2.37 2.45 2.57 2.56 2.37
May 2.02 2.08 2.22 2.19 2.01 2.05 2.22 2.30 2.48 1.86
Aug 1.84 2.25 2.25 2.26 2.30 2.30 2.39 2.50 2.62 1.98
Nov 2.64 2.71 2.71 2.72 2.42 2.46 2.51 2.65 2.71 2.61
2003 Feb 2.78 2.90 2.99 2.79 2.69 2.65 2.64 2.58 2.65 2.89
May 3.14 2.97 2.72 2.49 2.45 2.48 2.46 2.54 2.55 2.91
Aug 2.85 2.58 2.31 2.32 2.29 2.26 2.31 2.40 2.51 2.85
Nov 2.72 2.55 2.63 2.65 2.59 2.50 2.37 2.38 2.42 2.60
2004 Feb 1.34 1.60 1.60 1.71 1.77 1.68 1.71 1.76 1.87 2.30 1.25
May 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.43 1.60 1.71 1.76 1.98 2.13 2.17 1.45
Aug 1.18 1.22 1.32 1.38 1.53 1.53 1.64 1.96 2.01 2.11 1.24
Nov 1.13 1.13 1.28 1.47 1.55 1.61 1.69 1.77 1.83 2.26 1.44
2005 Feb 1.49 1.51 1.56 1.63 1.70 1.78 1.85 1.91 1.95 2.20 1.75
May 1.98 2.06 2.10 2.01 1.86 1.90 1.93 1.96 2.00 2.23 1.94
Aug 2.16 2.30 2.19 2.01 1.91 1.79 1.89 2.05 2.08 2.39 2.45
Nov 2.23 2.16 2.03 1.85 1.77 1.81 1.84 1.89 1.95 2.26 2.13
2006 Feb 1.96 1.94 1.97 2.00 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.04 2.03 1.92
May 2.27 2.19 2.33 2.35 2.12 2.10 2.09 2.06 2.01 2.20
A u g2 . 3 22 . 7 12 . 7 62 . 5 62 . 3 72 . 1 92 . 2 02 . 1 12 . 0 5 2 . 3 9
Nov 2.56 2.68 2.36 2.06 2.03 2.00 1.98 1.97 1.98 2.78
2007 Feb 2.85 2.49 2.16 1.92 1.69 1.79 1.94 2.08 2.20 2.88
May 2.52 2.25 2.06 1.95 1.83 1.84 1.99 2.08 2.18 2.64
A u g2 . 0 72 . 1 02 . 1 02 . 0 52 . 0 32 . 0 62 . 0 52 . 0 72 . 1 0 1 . 7 5
Note: Until 2003 RPIX forecasts, from 2004 CPI forecasts
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